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MITCHELL v. HELMS
Unequal Treatment or Separation of Church and State: Is the
Establishment Clause Offended by Government Aid to Parochial
Schools?
Matthew Curtis *
Does the First Amendment bar President Clinton from fulfilling his promise of
connecting every classroom in America to the Internet? The Supreme Court in Mitchell v.
Helms will decide what type of aid, if any, the government may provide to parochial schools
without infringing the First Amendment's Establishment Clause - "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."
Fourteen years ago, taxpayers in Louisiana's Jefferson Parish filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of federal Chapter 2 programs that provide secular aid to parochial schools
through block grants to individual states. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit heard the case last year and ruled that the Chapter 2 programs were unconstitutional
as implemented by Jefferson Parish. The Fifth Circuit relied on three previous Supreme
Court decisions: Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975);
and Committee for Public Education and Relgious Iberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980). The Fifth
Circuit concluded that those cases permitted some aid, such as the provision of secular
textbooks or funding for federally required achievement tests, but did not permit
government loans of instructional materials such as library books, overhead projectors,
computers, and printers.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's reliance on an apparent
trend within the Supreme Court of permitting more types of government aid to parochial
schools. The Supreme Court could choose Mitchell as the vehicle to provide additional
guidance on its interpretation of the Establishment Clause. A decision in Mitchell may also
suggest how the Court would rule in an upcoming school voucher issue. Will the Court
depart from past precedent and establish a more coherent guideline, or will it add further
confusion to an already chaotic area of law?
The Supreme Court could choose to uphold the Chapter 2 program, strike down all or a
portion of it, or find only that it is unconstitutional as applied in Jefferson Parish. The
Court, to avoid further muddying the establishment clause waters, could reject the
distinction between textbooks and "instructional materials" made by past Supreme Court
decisions and the Fifth Circuit. Such a distinction is largely meaningless. The government
provision of secular textbooks frees resources parochial schools would have otherwise spent
on textbooks, enabling them to purchase "instructional materials" or hire additional teachers
to advance their religious purpose. Thus, the aid is still provided, it simply takes a more
circuitous route.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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The Court could also tackle the question of whether government aid can be provided to
non-parochial private schools while denying such aid to religious schools. Private schools,
whether parochial or non-parochial, generally exist to further some ideology, even if it is
simply that public schools are insufficient or undesirable for educating some students.
Mitchell then, could serve as a companion case to Board of Regents v. Southworth because the
Court could choose to decide whether religious speech is to be treated differently than other
speech. (In Southworth, to be decided this term, the Court will decide whether mandatory
student fee funding of political speech violates the First Amendment) If the Court chooses
to distinguish between religious speech and other speech, such a distinction would seem to
be inconsistent with the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause.
And, lurking at the fringes of the Mitchell case, is the question of school vouchers.
Generally, vouchers provide a fixed sum - usually less than what is spent per-student by the
local public school system - to be used by parents electing to send their children to private
schools. Many see vouchers as a way to cure what they regard as a failing public education
system by injecting market forces such as competition into education thereby encouraging
public schools to improve. Vouchers also have the appeal of granting relief to those parents
who are paying taxes to support a public school system they do not utilize at the same time
they are paying tuition to send their children to private schools. Proponents of vouchers
have also sought support from low-income parents and social activists by arguing that
vouchers will permit more lower income children to attend private schools superior to many
of the aging inner-city public schools they now attend. However, such a voucher system is
plagued by the same constitutional concerns implicated by Mitchell- taxpayer aid to religion
and compelled funding of speech.
Mitchellgives the Supreme Court the opportunity to place religious speech on an equal
standing with other speech and simultaneously reject any compelled funding of speech,
whether that speech is religious or secular.
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98-1648 Mitchell v. Helms
Ruling below (Helms v. Picard, 5th Cir., 151 F.3d 347):
Chapter 2 of Tide I of 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act and its Louisiana
counterpart, as applied in Jefferson Parish to fund loan of state-owned instructional
equipment and library books to sectarian schools, violate First Amendment's establishment
clause; state loan of free textbooks to parochial schools, however, is permitted by Board of
Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Question presented: Does program under Chapter 2 of Title I of 1965 Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, which provides federal funds to state and local education agencies
to purchase and lend neutral, secular, and non-religious materials such as computers,
software, and library books to public and non-public schools for use by students attending
those schools, and which allocates funds on equal per-student basis regardless of religious or
secular character of schools students choose to attend, violate establishment clause of First
Amendment?
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Mary L. HELMS, et al., Appellants
V.
Guy MITCHELL, et al., Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
Decided August 17, 1998
DUHE, Circuit Judge:
I.
This case requires us to find our way
in the vast, perplexing desert of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, sued Defendant
Jefferson Parish School Board et al.,
claiming that three state and one federal
school aid programs were unconstitutional
as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.
(footnote omitted) The District Court
initially granted Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment on some issues. The
court then conducted a bench trial on the
remaining issues and rendered judgment.
When the case was reassigned due to the
district judge's retirement, the new judge
reversed some of the court's earlier
rulings. All told, the parties spent some
thirteen years in district court before
reaching this Court. During that time the
sand dunes have shifted.
III.
Plaintiffs also claim that Chapter 2 of
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 ("Chapter 2")' and
'On October 20, 1994, Congress enacted
the Improving America's School Act of
1994, Pub.L. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518.
its Louisiana counterpart,
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:351-52, violate the
Establishment Clause as applied in
Jefferson Parish insofar as they provide
direct aid to sectarian schools in the form
of educational and instructional materials.
Initially, the district court agreed and
granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment, finding that the loan of
state-owned instructional materials (such
as slide projectors, television sets, tape
recorders, maps, globes, computers, etc.)
to pervasively sectarian institutions had
the "primary effect of providing a direct
and substantial advancement to the
sectarian enterprise" and therefore
violated the Establishment Clause. The
court relied primarily on Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977), and Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975).
When the case was reassigned due to
Judge Frederick Heebe's retirement, Judge
Former Chapter 2 is now labeled
"Subchapter VI--Innovative Education
Program Strategies" and is codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (West Supp.1998).
For ease of reference, we will continue to
refer to new Subchapter VI as "Chapter
2." We will cite individual sections,
however, by reference to citations in the
current United States Code.
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Marcel Livaudais granted Defendants'
motion to reconsider the court's ruling.
Following the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Walker v. San Francisco Unfied
School District, 46 F.3d 1449, 1463-70
(1995), Judge Livaudais found that the
reasoning in Meek and Wolman, supra,
had been undermined by subsequent
Supreme Court cases. He therefore
reversed Judge Heebe's finding of
unconstitutionality and granted
Defendants' motion for summary
judgment, declaring Chapter 2 and
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17:351-52
constitutional, facially and as applied in
Jefferson Parish.
A.
Chapter 2 provides financial assistance
through "block grants" to state and local
educational agencies to implement eight
"innovative assistance programs." See 20
U.S.C. §§ 7311(b); 7312(a),(c)(1); 7351.
The challenged innovative assistance
program describes
programs for the acquisition and use
of instructional and educational
materials, including library services
and materials (including media
materials), assessments, reference
materials, computer software and
hardware for instructional use, and
other curricular materials which are
tied to high academic standards and
which will be used to improve
student achievement and which are
part of an overall education reform
program.
20 U.S.C. § 7351(b)(2).
Chapter 2 services are to be provided
to children enrolled in both "public and
private, nonprofit schools." 20 U.S.C. §
7312. Section 7372 provides that a local
educational agency shall equitably provide
"secular, neutral, and nonideological
services, materials, and equipment" to
students who are enrolled in private
nonprofit elementary and secondary
schools within its boundaries. 20 U.S.C. §
7372(a)(1). Chapter 2 funds for the
innovative assistance programs must
supplement, and in no case supplant,
"funds from non-Federal sources." 20
U.S.C. § 7371(b). The control of Chapter
2 funds, as well as title to all Chapter 2
"materials, equipment, and property,"
must be in a public agency, "and a public
agency shall administer such funds and
property." 20 U.S.C. § 7372(c)(1). In
addition, any services provided for the
benefit of private school students must be
provided by a public agency or through a
contractor who is "independent of such
private school and of any religious
organizations." 20 U.S.C. § 7372(c)(2).
Once Louisiana receives its Chapter 2
funds from the Federal government, the
designated State Educational Agency
("SEA") allocates 80 percent of the funds
to Local Educational Agencies ("LEAs").
Eighty-five percent of those funds are
earmarked for LEAs based on the number
of participating elementary and secondary
school students in both public and
private, nonprofit schools; 15% go to
LEAs based on the number of children
from low-income families. See 20 U.S.C. §
7312(a). During the fiscal year 1984-85,
Jefferson Parish received $655,671 in
Chapter 2 funds; about 70% of those
funds were allocated to public schools and
about 30% to nonpublic schools.
In 1984, the State instituted a
monitoring process to ensure that Chapter
2 materials were not being used for
religious purposes. Nonpublic schools
were encouraged but not required to sign
assurances that they would only use
5
loaned materials for secular purposes.
Additionally, LEAs made monitoring
visits to nonpublic schools, and the State
made monitoring visits to the LEAs and
to some nonpublic schools. After the
United States Department of Education
conducted an on-site visit to review the
Louisiana Chapter 2 program in
September, 1984, the Louisiana
Department of Education made changes
in monitoring LEAs. It increased, for
example, the frequency of on-site visits by
the Chapter 2 staff to LEAs from once
every three years to once every two years.
The State also began reviewing the
LEAs' monitoring process of the private
schools. LEAs, however, have primary
responsibility in Louisiana for monitoring
their Chapter 2 programs and for
compliance with all applicable State and
Federal guidelines. When State Chapter 2
monitors visited the JPPSS in April, 1985,
the monitors found that "the services,
materials, equipment, [and] other benefits
provided to nonpublic schools" in
Jefferson Parish were not "neutral, secular
and non-ideological."
A report of that evaluation prepared
by the Bureau of Evaluation indicates
that, while the LEAs "handle most of the
administrative matters related to Chapter
2, the nonpublic schools make the
decisions about how to spend their
Chapter 2 allocations, and they do so
independently of one another." The
report also states that "[e]xcept that funds
cannot be spent for support of religious
or ideological instruction, flexibility in the
use of Chapter 2 funds puts a minimum
of limitations on the kinds of expenditures
allowed." During the 1986-87 fiscal year,
for example, of the total amount of
Chapter 2 funds budgeted for nonpublic
schools ($214,080), $94,758 was spent to
provide library/media materials, $102,862
was spent for instructional equipment,
and $16,460 was spent for "local
improvement programs."
Ruth Woodward, the Coordinator of
the Chapter 2 program in Jefferson Parish,
stated that library books are ordered for
nonpublic schools, but not for public
schools. Such library books are stamped
"ECIA Chapter 2." Woodward reviews
the titles of books and other Chapter 2
materials and deletes titles she finds
inappropriate. After reviewing library
book orders from 1982, Woodward
discovered approximately 191 tides in
violation of Chapter 2 guidelines and had
the books recalled and donated to the
public library.
Woodward also stated that she
generally makes a single visit to a given
nonpublic school during the year. During
her monitoring visits, she stated that she
has "normally" found that the Chapter 2
materials and equipment are used in
accordance with Chapter 2 guidelines. A
review of the instructional materials
purchased with Chapter 2 funds during
1986-87 and loaned to nonpublic,
parochial schools reveals the following
kinds of items: filmstrip projectors,
overhead projectors, television sets,
motion picture projectors, video cassette
recorders, video camcorders, computers,
printers, phonographs, slide projectors,
etc. Woodward stated that no direct
payments of Chapter 2 funds are ever
made to nonpublic schools; the funds are
retained and administered by her office.
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B.
We will focus on the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Walker, supra, because Judge
Livaudais relied heavily on its reasoning
and also because it is the only other
Circuit decision to have addressed the
constitutionality of Chapter 2.
In Walker, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
confronted a Chapter 2 program that was,
in all relevant respects, identical to the one
we confront in Jefferson Parish. (footnote
omitted) The most significant aspect of
the Walker panel's reasoning is devoted to
assessing whether Chapter 2 has a
"primary or principal effect of advancing
religion." (footnote omitted) Walker, 46
F.3d at 1464- 69. The panel began by
observing that, with the cases of Meek,
Wolman and Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968), the Supreme Court "drew
a [constitutional] distinction between
providing textbooks and providing other
instructional materials--such as maps,
overhead projectors, and lab
equipment--to parochial schools or their
students." Walker, at 1464-65; see Allen, at
248; Meek, 421 U.S. at 362-63; Wolman,
433 U.S. at 237. The panel, however, was
not convinced that such a distinction was
still the law. In its view, subsequent
Supreme Court cases-- particularly,
Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), Ball,
supra, and Zobrest, supra--had "clarified the
holdings of Meek and Wolman, and
rendered untenable the thin distinction
between textbooks and other instructional
materials." Walker, at 1465. The Ninth
Circuit thus held that "under Chapter 2,
the loaning of neutral, secular equipment
and instructional materials to parochial
schools does not have the primary or
principal effect of advancing religion." Id.
The panel read Meek as an illogical
departure from Allen, which had upheld a
law requiring public school authorities to
lend textbooks, free of charge, to both
public and private school students. Allen,
at 248. The panel pointed out that "Allen
... rests on the robust principle that 'the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit a
State from extending the benefits of state
laws to all citizens without regard for their
religious affiliation.' " Walker, at 1465,
quoting Allen, at 242. In the panel's view,
however, the Court's subsequent decision
in Meek departed from Allen's reliance on
neutrality when Meek "upheld the
provision of textbooks to parochial school
students, but struck down the program
which loaned instructional materials and
equipment...." Walker, at 1465 (citations
omitted); see Meek, 421 U.S. at 362,
365-66.
Even though the Court's subsequent
decision in Wolman explicitly upheld Meek,
the Walker panel believed that "[i]n
reaffirming Meek's holding ... Wolman
undermined Meek's rationale." Walker, at
1465; see Wolman, 433 U.S. at 238
(upholding Meek and Allen). Specifically,
the panel concluded that Wolman had
"eviscerated" Meek's premise that "any
state aid to the educational functions of a
sectarian school is forbidden." Walker, at
1465. Wolman did so, the panel reasoned,
by "holding as constitutional a statute
under which the State prepared and
graded tests in secular subjects" for both
public and private, parochial schools. Id.
Thus, the Walker panel announced that
the paltry sum of Meek and Wolman was
the thin distinction--unmoored from any
Establishment Clause principles--that state
loans to parochial schools of instructional
materials and equipment impermissibly
advances religion, but state preparation
and grading of tests and state loans of
textbooks do not. Walker, at 1466.
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In the panel's estimation, the true
death-blow to Meek's textbooks vs. other
instructional materials dichotomy came
three years later in Regan, which
"recognized this weak distinction and
clarified that the provision of instructional
materials and equipment to parochial
schools is not always prohibited." Walker,
at 1466. But, as the panel recognized in
the next sentence, Regan merely reaffirmed
Wolman by "uph[olding] a law reimbursing
parochial schools for the costs of
administering tests required by the State."
Id.; see Regan, at 655 ("We agree with the
District Court that Wolman controls this
case."). Although Regan did not deal with
the provision of instructional materials to
parochial schools, and although Regan
explicitly followed Wolman and said
nothing about overruling Meek, the Walker
panel nonetheless declared with perfect
candor that
Regan thus instructs us that the
difference between textbooks and
other instructional equipment and
materials, such as science kits and
maps, is not of constitutional
significance.
Walker, at 1466. In our view, such a
statement could only mean that the panel
thought Regan silently overruled Meek.
The Walker panel thus adopted an
Establishment Clause analysis based on
what it identified as "the underlying
principle animating Establishment Clause
jurisprudence: government neutrality
towards religion." Id. at 1466, citing, inter
alia, Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10. The panel
stated its "test" as follows:
Government neutrality becomes
suspect when, in practical effect, the
governmental aid is targeted at or
disproportionately benefits religious
institutions, or when, in symbolic
effect, the governmental aid creates
a symbolic union between church
and state.
Walker, at 1467. Applying its test, the
panel easily found that Chapter 2 passed
constitutional muster. First, it found that
Chapter 2 benefits were "neutrally
available without regard to religion" given
that "an overwhelming percentage of
beneficiaries [were] nonparochial schools
and their students." Id. (footnote omitted)
Second, the panel found that the
constraints under which Chapter 2
services were provided "adequately
safeguard[ed] Chapter 2 benefits from
improper diversion to religious use." Id.
at 1467-68. Finally, the panel reasoned
that, if the state-paid interpreter on
sectarian school premises in Zobrest did
not create a symbolic union between
government and religion, then "certainly
having religiously neutral material and
equipment in the same classroom does
not create a symbolic union either." Id. at
1468, iting Zobrest, at 13.
Although it had already established (to
its own satisfaction) that Meek and Wolman
were no longer good law, the panel went
on to distinguish the aid programs in
those cases from Chapter 2:
[T]he statutes struck down in Meek
and Wolman are fundamentally
different from the Chapter 2 statute
at issue here. The statute in Meek
was not neutral because it provided
close to $12 million in aid that was
targeted directly at private schools,
of which more than 75% were
church- related. Similarly, in
Wolman, the statute was not neutral
because it provided $88.8 million in
aid that was targeted directly at
private schools, of which 9 6 % were
church-related and 92% were
Catholic. Here, seventy-four
percent of Chapter 2 benefits went
to public schools. Of the remaining
8
twenty-six percent ... a substantial
portion was allocated to
nonreligious private schools.
Indeed, over thirty percent of the
private schools under the Chapter 2
program are nonreligious. Thus,
unlike the statutes in Meek and
Wolman, Chapter 2 is a neutral,
generally applicable statute that
provides benefits to all schools, of
which the overwhelming
beneficiaries are nonparochial
schools.
Walker, at 1468.2
C.
When we carefully review the
Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Allen, Meek, Wolman, and Regan, it is
tempting to complain that the high Court
has instructed us confusingly. As merely
one example, the Court in Allen registered
its disagreement with the proposition
"that the processes of secular and
religious training are so intertwined that
secular textbooks furnished to students by
the public are in fact instrumental in the
teaching of religion." Allen, at 248. Only
seven years later, however, the Court was
heard to say in Meek that "[t]he secular
education [that parochial] schools provide
2 The panel also found that Chapter 2 did
not violate the "entanglement" prong of
Lemon, given the minimal intrusion onto
the parochial schools premises by State
monitors, and also given the "self-
policing" nature of the neutral
instructional materials and equipment.
Walker, at 1469, iting, inter alia, Meek, at
365, and Zobrest, at 13-14.
goes hand in hand with the religious
mission that is the only reason for the
schools' existence. Within the institution,
the two are inextricably intertwined."
Meek, at 366, quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at
657 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (emphasis
added). Lest we fall into despair,
however, we will view the Court's cases
dealing with state aid to religious schools
more in terms of what they did rather
than what they said.
When we take that approach, the
solution becomes compellingly clear and
simple. Meek and Wolman have squarely
held that what the government is
attempting to accomplish through
Chapter 2, it may not do. No case has
struck down Meek or Wolman. * * *
Meek invalidated a Pennsylvania
statute that authorized the Secretary of
Education to lend to parochial schools
"instructional materials" which included
"periodicals, photographs, maps, charts,
sound recordings, films, ... projection
equipment, recording equipment, and
laboratory equipment." Meek, at 354-55;
see also Meek, at 354 n. 4 (complete
statutory definition of "instructional
materials."). Meek is directly on point and
has not been overruled by any Supreme
Court case. We thus "follow the case that
directly controls." See Agostini, 117 S.Ct.
at 2017.
In Allen, Meek, Wolman, and Regan, the
Court drew a series of boundary lines
between constitutional and
unconstitutional state aid to parochial
schools, based on the character of the aid
itself. Allen approved textbook loans to
parochial schools because the evidence
did not indicate that "all textbooks ... are
used by the parochial schools to teach
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religion." Allen, at 248. While recognizing
that books, if they were religious books,
could have the effect of indoctrination,
the Allen Court likened the purely secular
books at issue there to the bus
transportation subsidized in Everson v.
Board ofEducation, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947):
neither bus rides nor purely secular
textbooks had "inherent religious
significance." Allen, at 244. While
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in
Allen, they did so based on a different
conception of the role of textbooks in
parochial schools. See Allen, at 252 (Black,J., dissenting) ("Books are the most essential
tool of education since they contain the
resources of knowledge which the
educational process is designed to
exploit."), and Allen, at 257 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The textbook goes to the very
heart of the education in a parochial
school."). Both the majority and the
dissenting opinions, however, consistently
focused on the character of the aid given
to parochial schools.
Meek and Wolman, while both
reaffirming Allen, nevertheless invalidated
state programs lending instructional
materials other than textbooks to
parochial schools and schoolchildren.
Meek merely intimated that the character
of the aid was the determinative feature in
its holding. See Meek, at 364 ("[A] State
may include church-related schools in
programs providing bus transportation,
school lunches, and public health
facilities-- secular and nonideological
services unrelated to the primary,
religion-oriented educational function of
the sectarian school.") (emphasis added).
But Wolman clarified that, in the Court's
view, the character of the aid itself
determined whether the aid was
constitutional. Wolman did so by
upholding several different types of aid
(textbooks, administration of
state-required standardized tests,
speech/hearing diagnostic services,
off-premises therapeutic/guidance!
remedial services), while at the same time
striking down, based on Meek, the loan of
instructional materials to parochial
schoolchildren. See Wolman, at 236-52.
The Wolman Court distinguished among
these various types of aid by reference to
the particular attributes of the aid itself.
See, e.g., Wolman, at 244 ("[D]iagnostic
services, unlike teaching or counseling,
have little or no educational content and
are not closely associated with the
educational mission of the nonpublic
school."). Wolman candidly recognized
the "tension" existing between the
holdings in Meek and Allen and sought to
resolve that tension by emphasizing the
unique character of the aid approved in
Allen, i.e., that "the educational content of
textbooks is something that can be
ascertained in advance and cannot be
diverted to sectarian uses." See Wolman, at
251 n. 18; see also Committee for Public
Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781-82
(1973).
Contrary to the Walker panel's view,
Regan did nothing to "instruct us that the
difference between textbooks and other
instructional equipment and materials ... is
not of constitutional significance."
Walker, at 1466. Regan did exactly the
opposite. In seeking to harmonize the
holdings of Meek and Wolman, the Regan
Court merely observed that Meek did not
forbid all types of aid to sectarian schools.
See Regan, at 661. Indeed, as the Regan
Court realized, if Meek stood for such a
proposition, then Wolman's approval of,
for example, the testing and grading
services would have flown in the face of
precedent. See id. Regan clarified that Meek
only invalidates a particular kind of aid to
parochial schools--the loan of
instructional materials. See id. at 662.
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The Walker panel made a flawed
attempt to avoid the holdings of Meek and
Wolman by "distinguishing" the statutes at
issue in those cases from the Chapter 2
program. The panel opined that the Meek
and Wolman statutes were "fundamentally
different" from Chapter 2 because they
were not "neutral." Walker, at 1468. By
this, the panel meant that the challenged
programs in Meek and Wolman directly
targeted massive aid to private schools,
the vast majority of which were
religiously-affiliated. See id. By contrast,
the panel distinguished Chapter 2 as a
"neutral, generally applicable statute that
provides benefits to all schools, of which
the overwhelming beneficiaries are
nonparochial schools." Id. But Walker
misunderstood the aid programs struck
down in Meek and Wolman.
Those cases dealt with general aid
programs designed to provide equitable
benefits to both public and nonpublic
schoolchildren. See Meek, at 351-52 (* * *)
(citations omitted), and Wolman, at 234.
The Meek and Wolman Courts, however,
dedicated their discussion to those parts
of the programs that channeled aid to
nonpublic schools, because it was the
character of the aid provided to those
schools, and not the relative percentages
of aid distributed between public and
nonpublic schools, that was determinative.
See Walker, at 302 n. 1 (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc
rehearing). Thus, the percentages
discussed in Meek and Wolman were
completely irrelevant to the
constitutionality of the programs at issue
there, as was the fact that the general aid
programs might have been implemented
by two separate statutes. The Court
observed in Meek, in a different context,
that "it is of no constitutional significance
whether the general program is codified in
one statute or two." Meek, at 360 n. 8.
Since Walker was decided before the
Supreme Court handed down Agostini, we
should add that Agostini also does not
overrule Meek or Wolman; nor does
Agostini dismantle the distinction between
textbooks and other educational materials.
In fact, Agostini does not even address that
issue. Agostini does, it is true, discard a
premise on which Meek relied--i.e., that
"[s]ubstantial aid to the educational
function of [sectarian] schools ...
necessarily results in aid to the sectarian
school enterprise as a whole." Meek, at
366, 95 S.Ct. 1753 (emphasis added). But
Agostini does not replace that assumption
with the opposite assumption; instead,
Agostini only goes so far as to "depart[]
from the rule ... that all government aid
that directly aids the educational function
of religious schools is invalid." Agostini,
117 S.Ct. at 2011 (emphasis added).
Agostini holds only that the aid at issue
there (i.e., the on-premises provision of
special education services by state- paid
teachers) was not the kind of
governmental aid that impermissibly
advanced religion. Id. 2016. Agostini says
nothing about the loan of instructional
materials to parochial schools and we
therefore do not read it as overruling Meek
or Wolman. Agostini only instructs us that
Meek's presumption regarding
instructional materials should not be
applied to state-paid teachers on parochial
schools premises. See Agostini, at 2012; see
also Ball, 473 U.S. at 395-96 (applying
Meek and Wolman to state-paid teachers).
D.
Applying Meek and Wolman, we hold
that Chapter 2, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373,
and its Louisiana counterpart,
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 17:351- 52, are
unconstitutional as applied in Jefferson
Parish, to the extent that either program
permits the loaning of educational or
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instructional equipment to sectarian
schools. By prohibiting the loaning of
such materials, our decree encompasses
such items as filmstrip projectors,
overhead projectors, television sets,
motion picture projectors, video cassette
recorders, video camcorders, computers,
printers, phonographs, slide projectors,
etc. See, e.g., Meek, at 354 n. 4. Our decree
also necessarily prohibits the furnishing of
library books by the State, even from
prescreened lists. We can see no way to
distinguish library books from the
"periodicals ... maps, charts, sound
recordings, films, or any other[] printed
and published materials of a similar
nature" prohibited by Meek. See id. at 355
(internal quotes omitted). The Supreme
Court has only allowed the lending of free
textbooks to parochial schools; the term
"textbook" has generally been defined by
the case law as "a book which a pupil is
required to use as a text for a semester or
more in a particular class he legally
attends." Allen, at 239 n. 1. We do not
think library books can be subsumed
within that definition.
We therefore REVERSE Judge
Livaudais' grant of summary judgment in
favor of Defendants and RENDER
judgment declaring Chapter 2, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 7301-7373, and its Louisiana
counterpart, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 17:351-
52, unconstitutional as applied in
Jefferson Parish.
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WHITE HOUSE SEEKS RULING ON PRIVATE SCHOOL AID
The New York Times
Sunday, June 6,1999
Linda Greenhouse
Raising the stakes in the debate over
public aid to parochial schools, the
Clinton Administration is asking the
Supreme Court to review a Federal court's
finding that it is unconstitutional for
public schools to provide computers and
other "instructional equipment" for use in
religious school classrooms.
The Administration has proposed
spending $800 million on an educational
technology program that would, among
other things, help connect every
classroom and school library in the
country to the Internet. But the little-
noticed ruling last August by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in New Orleans, poses a
formidable constitutional obstacle to that
goal, as the Administration told the
Supreme Court in a brief it filed last
month.
The Administration's brief supports a
group of parochial school parents from
the New Orleans area who are appealing
the decision.
The implications of the case reach far
beyond classroom computers to the highly
charged question of where -- and how --
to draw the line between permissible and
prohibited Government assistance to
religious schools. Although the question
of publicly financed vouchers for religious
school tuition is not directly at issue, the
stakes are high for that constitutional
debate as well.
The Court is likely to announce later
this month whether it will hear the appeal,
a prospect significantly enhanced by the
Administration's intervention. The fact
that another Federal appeals court, the
Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, reached an
opposite conclusion three years earlier
also adds to the likelihood that the
Justices will add the case to their docket
for the next term.
The Fifth Circuit case began as a
challenge to a provision of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965
under which public schools receive
Federal aid for special services and
equipment, including computers, and
must share the material on a "secular,
neutral, and nonideological" basis with
students enrolled in private schools within
their boundaries. Several taxpayers in
Jefferson Parish, La., where 41 out of 46
private schools were religious, objected
that this aspect of the program was
unconstitutional and filed a lawsuit in
1985.
The case had a tangled history before
finally reaching the appeals court last year.
Writing for a three-judge panel, Judge
John M. Duhe Jr. opened his opinion by
commenting that "this case requires us to
find our way in the vast, perplexing desert
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence."
He then went on to find that a series of
Supreme Court decisions on parochial
school aid, dating from the 19 7 0's, had
drawn a fairly clear line between the
permissible and the prohibited, based on
the "character of the aid itself."
Textbooks in secular subjects were on
the permissible side of the line, Judge
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Duhe said, because in the Supreme
Court's view, the public school district
could screen the books in advance to
make sure that they would not be used as
part of a parochial school's religious
mission. But he said the precedents made
clear that other material, with less easily
confined and ascertainable content, more
subject to diversion to religious purposes,
was off-limits.
Whether the Fifth Circuit's view of
the current state of the law is accurate is
obviously open to debate, given the Ninth
Circuit's conflicting opinion in a similar
case. So the real question in this case,
Mitchell v. Helms, No. 98-1648, is where
the Justices think their precedents place
the line, and whether they are prepared to
adjust or jettison those precedents to
make room for technology that was not
even on the horizon a quarter-century
ago.
Two years ago, in a case from New
York that concerned another provision of
the same 1965 Federal education law, the
Court explicitly overturned an earlier
decision and ruled that the Constitution
permitted public school teachers to offer
remedial courses in parochial school
classrooms. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor's opinion for a 5-to-4 majority
in that case, Agostini v. Felton, said the
Court's "understanding of the criteria
used to assess whether aid to religion has
an impermissible effect" had changed and
that a 1985 decision barring public school
teachers from parochial classrooms was
accordingly no longer good law.
In his brief for the Administration in
the current case, Solicitor General Seth P.
Waxman cited the Agostini decision as an
indication that the "broad categorical
rule" the Fifth Circuit derived from the
Supreme Court's precedents, with
textbooks on one side of the line and
everything else on the other, is no longer
an accurate statement of the majority's
view. The brief invites the Justices to re-
examine the precedents and adopt "a
more nuanced rule" that would permit
public schools to provide computers and
other instructional equipment to parochial
schools as long as safeguards were in place
to make sure the material would not be
diverted to religious use and would not
"supplant resources that the school itself
would otherwise provide or obtain."
Although cases in the lower courts
seeking or challenging tuition vouchers
for parochial schools have been receiving
headlines, this case has been the focus of
intense interest among lawyers and others
who monitor church-state developments.
The parochial school parents bringing the
appeal are represented by Michael W.
McConnell, a law professor at the
University of Utah whose articles and
advocacy for the view that religious and
secular institutions are constitutionally
entitled to equal treatment have been
highly influential over the last decade.
In his brief, Mr. McConnell
maintained that the Fifth Circuit's
decision "consigns those who attend
religiously affiliated schools to the use of
textbooks under the program, while
children of other taxpayers are using
graphing calculators to solve polynomial
equations and reading about the latest in
Mesopotamian archeological discoveries
on CD-ROM's."
Lee Boothby, a Washington lawyer
and well-known advocate of strict church-
state separation, has represented the
plaintiffs in this case since they filed their
lawsuit 14 years ago. "What's really at
stake," he said in an interview this week,
"is whether we will abandon the concept
the Court has historically followed of not
providing any direct aid" to parochial
schools. "The Court is being asked to
reject some pretty bedrock no-direct-aid
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principles," he said, adding that if the
Justices accepted that invitation, "I don't
know where you draw the line."
Copyright © 1999 The New York Times
Company
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JEFF CASE SPOTLIGHTS SCHOOL AID BATTLE
High Court Weighs Church-State Issue
The Tines-Picayune
Tuesday, June 15, 1999
Bill Walsh, Washington Bureau
Seizing upon a Jefferson Parish case
that has meandered through the courts for
14 years, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled
Monday that it is once again prepared to
venture into the turbulent debate over
whether public aid should be given to
parochial schools.
The court decided to hear the
Louisiana lawsuit, which challenges the
use of taxpayer money to transport and
provide equipment for parochial schools,
a month after the Clinton administration
complained that its goal of linking all
American classrooms to the Internet
would be subverted by a lower court
ruling in the case blocking certain public
grants to religious schools.
The Supreme Court's decision, which
probably won't be handed down until
2000, is expected to clarify whether, or in
which cases, the public should underwrite
private and parochial education. It is an
issue of keen interest around the country
and especially in the New Orleans area
where the Catholic Archdiocese operates
104 schools that receive millions annually
in federal government assistance.
"It's a burning question, the
government's effort to assist parochial
schools," said Paul Baier, a constitutional
expert at the Louisiana State University
Law School. "The court has been backing
away from any rigid interpretation of
church versus state. It looks like the court
wants to elaborate on it even further."
It could, legal experts said, even be
used to signal whether it would be
constitutional for government vouchers to
be used to pay tuition at private and
church-run schools.
The court's decision to review
Mitchell v. Helms was not altogether
unexpected. Recent lower court rulings
have raised questions about exactly how
high the wall between church and state
should be when it comes to educational
financing. And when the administration
seeks a legal clarification, as Solicitor
General Seth Waxman did in May, the
Supreme Court is inclined to take a hard
look.
For the original plaintiffs, a group of
public school parents in Jefferson Parish,
the Supreme Court review is just the next
stop in a circuitous and frustratingly long
legal odyssey.
"It's slow justice (but) we at least have
been given or opportunity to be heard,"
said Neva Helms of Metairie, whose 26-
year-old daughter, Amy, was in middle
school when the suit was filed in
December 1985. Helms, who was an
active volunteer with the Jefferson Parish
public school system, was stirred to action
when she learned that parochial school
students in her neighborhood were being
shuttled to their classrooms on publicly
subsidized buses. She soon found out that
32 percent of money Jefferson Parish
received from a federal education program
-- more than $655,000 in 1984-1985 --
went to private schools.
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With the financial backing of
Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Helms and two other
parents sued local, state and federal
education officials challenging a variety of
taxpayer expenditures on private schools,
including busing, special education
training and classroom equipment.
Americans United issued a statement
Monday calling the case "the most
important church-state lawsuit to come
before the Supreme Court in over two
decades."
The court will review a U.S. 5th
Circuit Court of Appeals decision out of
New Orleans last August that struck down
the federal education program by ruling
that it is unconstitutional to spend public
money on religiously affiliated elementary
and secondary schools, except for
textbooks.
The court came to that decision after
reviewing a long line of cases that sought
to delineate which public expenditures for
private schools were proper, and which
were not. It is apparent from the
introduction to Judge John Duhe Jr.'s
opinion for the three-judge panel just how
murky the church-state issue is.
"This case requires us to find our way
in the vast, perplexing desert of
jurisprudence" on the issue, Duhe wrote,
noting that in the almost 14 years since
the Jefferson Parish case was filed, "the
sand dunes have shifted."
Indeed they have. In the 1970s, the
U.S. Supreme Court seemed to draw a
sharp line between church and state when
it came to education financing. But in
recent years, the court has identified some
exceptions to its rule. In 1993, it said that
public school districts can provide sign
language interpreters to deaf children at
parochial schools. Then, in 1997, the
court said public school teachers can offer
remedial aid to parochial school students
as well. The solicitor general urged the
court in his brief last month to expand the
interpretation even more.
Attorneys representing parochial
school parents argued that the 5th Circuit
ruling limiting the use of education grants
unfairly punishes students attending
private schools.
"It consigns those who attend
religiously affiliated schools to the use of
textbooks under the program, while
children of other taxpayers are using
graphing calculators to solve polynomial
equations and reading about the latest
Mesopotamian archeological discoveries
on CD-ROMs," attorneys wrote in their
brief to the Supreme Court.
The stakes are high for religiously
affiliated schools locally and around the
nation.
A spokesman for the Archdiocese of
New Orleans said that its schools in the
eight New Orleans area parishes received
$17 million in federal education-related
financing in the 1997-1998 school year.
Although not party to the suit, the
archdiocese has kept a close eye on the
litigation.
"The Archdiocese is hopeful that in
light of recent Supreme Court decisions,
the court will clarify that the federal law is,
indeed, valid," the archdiocese said in a
statement Monday.
Baier, the LSU law professor, said the
Supreme Court has been itching for years
to leave its mark on church-state
jurisprudence, but how far the court will
reach remains unclear.
He said it's possible that the decision
could even have an impact on the highly
contentious issue of government vouchers
for students who attend religiously
affiliated schools.
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"It may have a spillover effect, we just
have to wait and see," Baier said. "The
Supreme Court can make a case as big as
it wants to make it."
Copyright © 1999 The Times-Picayune
Publishing Co.
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SUPREME COURT WILL REVIEW HIGH-TECH AID TO
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
The Washington Post
Tuesday, June 15, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday
to decide whether taxpayer funds can be
used to pay for computers, software and
other library equipment in parochial
schools. The court's ultimate ruling will
likely influence the contentious
nationwide debate over the use of publicly
financed vouchers to help students attend
religious schools.
Further fueling broad interest in the
case, which will be heard by the court next
fall and likely decided in 2000, is its
relationship to the Clinton
administration's proposal to connect all
classrooms--in both public and private
schools--to the Internet. Although the
administration opposes the use of public
vouchers to pay for religious schools, it
has taken the other side in the case before
the Supreme Court, supporting the New
Orleans parochial school parents who
have appealed a lower court's
interpretation of federal education law
that would bar such public high-tech
assistance to religious schools.
At its broadest, the dispute will offer
the court an opportunity to clarify its
doctrine on the constitutional separation
of church and state and provide guidance
on permissible aid to religious schools.
Although the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled last year that federal funds
could not be used to provide educational
materials other than textbooks to religious
schools, another appeals court, the 9th
Circuit based on the West Coast, ruled the
opposite.
The federal program at issue in
Mitchell v. Helms flows from the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, which gives public school
districts money for special services and
instructional equipment and requires the
funds to be shared with nonpublic schools
within the district.
"This case vitally affects the quality of
education available to over a million
schoolchildren nationwide," the New
Orleans parents said in their appeal to the
Supreme Court. "Congress has wisely
recognized that the national interest is
served when all schoolchildren have
access to supplementary educational
resources and equipment in keeping with
this fast-moving, technological age,
without regard to whether their schools
are public or private, religious or secular."
The taxpayers who have urged the
high court to affirm the 5th Circuit say
providing computers, software and other
resource equipment beyond textbooks is
unconstitutional because "it provides
direct aid . .. [and] the items furnished are
easily divertable to religious and sectarian
school administrative purposes."
The 5th Circuit's 1998 decision relied
primarily on Supreme Court rulings that
have generally prohibited the government
from providing educational materials
other than textbooks to parochial schools.
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But in recent years, the Supreme Court
has begun to permit more government
support for and involvement in religious
programs, for example, by permitting
public school teachers to provide remedial
help at parochial schools.
Separately, the court, over the lone
dissent of Justice Clarence Thomas,
refused to intervene in an ongoing case
involving Columbia Union College in
Takoma Park. The college, affiliated with
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, is
seeking financial aid under a Maryland
state program that provides financial
assistance to private colleges, but the
Maryland Higher Education Commission
has concluded that Columbia Union is
"too religious" to participate. A federal
appeals court has ordered an investigation
to determine whether the school is
"pervasively sectarian" and thus ineligible
for the state aid. (Columbia Union College
v. Clark)
Copyright C 1999 The Washington Post
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ESTABLISHING RELIGION OR AIDING SCHOOLS?
The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC)
Monday, June 21,1999
James Kilpatrick, Universal Press Syndicate
WASHINGTON - The story is told
of Sisyphus, king of Corinth. He angered
Zeus, who banished him to the
Underworld. There he was condemned
for all eternity to push a heavy stone up a
hill, only to have the stone roll down
before he reached the top.
Something like this is happening at the
Supreme Court. The Supremes keep
struggling with the intractable mysteries of
the Constitution's establishment clause.
Every time the court thinks it has solved
one mystery, the stone rolls back down
again.
The Constitution says, with murky
clarity, that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion."
The high court has extended that edict to
the states, but the court has found
unceasing difficulty in defining such
obscure words as "no law," "respecting,"
"establishment" and "religion."
Now, here we go again. Cases
involving state aid to pupils attending
church-sponsored schools are rolling up
like thunderclouds on a summer
afternoon. The cases come from Ohio,
Maine, Arizona and Louisiana, following
in the train of landmark cases from
Wisconsin and New York. Everyone
wants a piece of the action.
On May 27, the Supreme Court of
Ohio upheld a program providing tuition
vouchers for the children of low-income
families in Cleveland. The vouchers are in
the form of tax credits covering 75
percent to 90 percent of tuition costs in a
nonpublic school, up to a maximum of S
2,500. The checks are made payable to
parents, who endorse them in turn to the
child's school. Most of the nonpublic
schools are Catholic parochial schools. Is
Ohio's law a law respecting an
establishment of religion?
On the same day, May 27, the
Supreme Court of Maine took off in
another direction. The state had
established a program of tuition grants for
children residing in thinly populated areas
that have no public schools. The plan
specifically excludes children who wish to
attend denominational schools. The U.S.
Constitution says that Maine cannot deny
to any person the equal protection of its
laws. Does this discrimination against
Catholic children deny them equal
protection? The Maine court said it does
not.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th
Circuit ruled last August that Louisiana
has violated the establishment clause in its
handling of a federal program known as
Title VI. Now the case is pending for
review by the Supreme Court.
Using Title VI money, Louisiana buys
a wide variety of instructional equipment.
The equipment then is lent to individual
public and nonpublic schools. Taxpayers
in Jefferson Parish complained that the
program unconstitutionally benefits
establishments of religion.
The Clinton administration defends
the Title VI program. The solicitor general
emphasizes the "secular, neutral and
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nonideological" nature of the grants. The
idea is to supplement, not to supplant,
existing state funding. The states monitor
the use made of the federal money to
assure that it does not go to sectarian
purposes.
The government's argument did not
impress the 5th Circuit. It ruled that (1)
Louisiana's program advances the cause of
religion, and (2) the monitoring entangles
the state with the church. The 9th Circuit
has upheld an almost identical program in
California. The intercircuit conflict may
compel the high court to grant review.
A complex arrangement from Arizona
also is pending for review. Under state
law, any Arizona taxpayer, with or without
children in schools, may direct that up to
$ 500 of income tax obligation will be
used to provide scholarships and tuition
grants to students attending nonpublic
schools. At least 70 percent of the
nonpublic schools are church-related.
Participating taxpayers send their
checks not to the state treasurer, but as
voluntary contributions to an STO
(School Tuition Organization). The STOs
then parcel out the money to the children,
hence to the schools. Does the plan
violate the equal protection clause?
Opponents of the plan call it a sham. The
Arizona Supreme Court found it OK.
As an editor and columnist, I have
supported the concept of tuition grants
for the past 40 years. I see no reason why
the neutral, secular benefits provided by
the state to children in public schools
should be denied to children in private
schools. That's my opinion. Next year we
will get the court's opinion. Again.
Copyright C 1999 The News and Observer
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